We study a model of vendors competing to sell a homogeneous product to customers spread evenly along a circular city. This model is based on Hotelling's celebrated paper in 1929. Our aim in this paper is to present a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium. This yields a representation for the equilibrium. To achieve this, we first formulate the model mathematically. Next, we prove that the condition holds if and only if vendors are equilibrium. † ‡
Introduction
We study a model in which a circular city lies on a circle with circumference length 1 and customers are uniformly distributed with density 1 along this circle. We consider n vendors moving on this circle. Let the location of the vendor k (k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) be x k ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n and denote the location of n vendors (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) by x. Since we study the competition between vendors, we consider n ≥ 2 in particular. The price of one unit of product for each vendor is identical. Moreover, we assume the following.
If there exist l (l = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) vendors nearest to a customer, the customer purchases 1/l unit of product per unit of time from each of the l vendors respectively.
Every vendor then seeks a location to maximize his profit. We then represent the profit of vendor k per unit of time by a mathematical notation. Given a vector ξ = (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . , ξ n ) ∈ [0, 1] n and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, we first denote a distance on the circle between x, y ∈ [0, 1] by d(x, y) = min{|x− y + 1|, |x− y|, |x− y −1|}. We then define a set S(ξ, y) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} : d(ξ j , y) = min i d(ξ i , y)}. where |S(ξ, y)| represents a number of elements in a set S(ξ, y). We call f k (x) the profit of vendor k per unit of time for a location x. We then define equilibrium as follows.
By using a density function
holds for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and x k ∈ [0, 1].
We review the known results. The present model is based on the Hotelling's pioneer work [2] . Although we consider the circle as a product space, Hotelling dealed with a finite line. Our model was introduced by Eaton and Lipsey [1] , who discussed with the existence of equilibria for the model without the price. On the other hand, taking the price into account, Salop [3] studied with the model for two vendors. In this paper, we are concerned with n vendors and investigate their equilibrium. Our goal is to present a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium.
For convenience, we set
Then our main theorem is as follows.
x is equilibrium, if and only if the following condition (1.1) hold.
We define a set |I j | = max l∈{1,2,··· ,xn} |I l |.
where |I| represents the length of an interval I.
Remark 1.1. From (1.1), we notice that any location becomes equilibrium for n = 2. On the other hand, we find that equilibrium is x * = 0, 1 2 , 1 2 , 0, 0, 1 2 for n = 3.
Preliminary
In this section, we prepare some lemmas and a proposition to prove our main theorem in a next section. We first consider the profit of i vendors which locate at one point. We have the following lemma.
Proof.
Next, the following proposition play an important role.
is equilibrium, the following holds.
No more than 2 vendors can occupy a location.
(2.1)
Proof.
We prove that x is not equilibrium, provided that i (3 ≤ i ≤ n) vendors occupy at a point. We assume that x l < x l+1 = · · · = x k = · · · = x l+i < x l+i+1 (l ≥ 0, l + i + 1 ≤ n + 1, 3 ≤ i ≤ n). Therefore there exist x l and x l+i+1 at least one respectively. We notice that x l < x k < x l+i+1 and there exists no vendor on (x l , x k ) and (x k , x l+i+1 ).
For the other case |I l | < |I l+i |, from the symmetry, we can similarly show that there exists x ′ k such that f k (x 1 , · · · , x k−1 , x ′ k , x k+1 , · · · , x n ) > f k (x). We can complete the proof of (2.1).
Finally, we compare a location after the movement of a vendor with the original one. To do this, we introduce the following notation.
For a given location of n vendors x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) with (0 =)x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n , we move vendor k from x k to any fixed point in A ⊂ [0, 1]. We denote the resultant location by x k → A. We notice that x k → A represents the following vector
k is a location of vendor k after movement and x ′ k ∈ A.
Proof of Theorem 1.1
We are now position to prove our main theorem. We divide this proof into following two cases. We show that n = 2 and n ≥ 3.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (i)
We are concerned with the case where n = 2. We prove that every x is equilibrium. 0(= 1)
We notice that f 1 (x) = f 2 (x) = 1 2 in this case.
(ii) x 1 = x 2 0(= 1)
We have that f 1 (x) = f 2 (x) = 1 2 with every x.
Thus we showed that f k (x) ≥ f k (x k → [0, 1]) (k = 1, 2). Forthermore, this holds |I 1 | + |I 2 | ≥ |I 1 | and |I 1 | + |I 2 | ≥ |I 2 |. Thus every x holds (1.1).
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (ii)
Finally, we are concerned with the case where n ≥ 3.
Proof. First, we show that (1.1) is a sufficient condition for equilibrium.
We show that f k (x) ≥ 1 2 |I j |.
We notice that f k (x) = 1 2
We notice that f k (x) = 1 2 · 2 (|I j | + |I j |) = 1 2 |I j |.
Thus we showed that f k (x) ≥ 1 2 |I j |.
We
There exists no vendor at x k except for vendor k and vendor k moved next to x k 0(= 1)
. (c) There exists another vendor at x k except for vendor k and vendor k moved next to x k , or vendor k moved to a place that is not next to x k
We notice that
Next, we show that (1.1) is a necessary condition for equilibrium. Therefore, we prove that if (1.1) do not hold, then x is not equilibrium. That is to say that for existing k, x with |I k | + |I k+1 | < |I j | is not equilibrium |I j | = max l∈{1,2,··· ,xn} |I l | .
Observing Proposition 2.2, we do not have to treat with the case where more than 2 vendors occupy a location. (i) x k = x k+1 and x k+1 = x k+2
We have f k+1 (x) = 1 2 (|I k | + |I k+1 |) < 1 2 |I j |.
Setting x k+1 → (x j , x j+1 ), we have f k+1 (x k+1 → (x j , x j+1 )) = 1 2 |I j | > f k+1 (x). Thus x with this case is not equilibrium. (ii) x k = x k+1 (resp. x k−1 = x k ) From |I k |+|I k+1 | < |I j | and |I k | = 0, we get |I k+1 | < |i j |. Forthermore, we have |I k−1 | ≤ |I j |. Thus we notice that f k (x) = 1 2
Setting x k → (x j , x j+1 ), we have f k (x k → (x j , x j+1 )) = 1 2 |I j | > f k (x). Thus x with this case is not equilibrium.
From (i)-(ii), we showed that (1.1) is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
We can complete the proof of Theorem 1.1.
